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When the General Assembly of Virginia enacted section 18.2-311 in
1975, only three crimes were punishable as capital offenses in the Common-
wealth of Virginia. Within the next twenty years, the General Assembly
greatly enlarged the scope of section 18.2-31 by making several more crimes
punishable by death and by expanding the scope of existing capital offenses.
The systematic growth and expansion of section 18.2-31 has resulted in an
increase in the number of capital offenses from three to twelve2 as of 1999.'
This article will trace and assess the statutory expansion of section 18.2-31
from its enactment in 1975 to the present.
In 1975, section 18.2-31 included only:
(a) the wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing of any person
in the commission of abduction, as defined in section 18.2-48,
when such abduction was committed with the intent to extort
money, or a pecuniary benefit;
(b) the wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing of a human
being by another for hire; and
(c) the wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing by an inmate in
a penal institution as defined in section 53-19.18, or while in the
custody of an employee thereof.
J.D. Candidate, May 2000, Washington & Lee University School of Law; B.A.,
University Of Maryland at College Park. Thank you to my parents for their love and
guidance. Also, thanks to Professors Groot and Geimer for their support and inspiration.
In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Mercy-Giving.
1. 1975 Va. Acts, ch. 14, 15.
2. See Payne v. Commonwealth, 509 S.E.2d 293, 300 (Va. 1999) (holding that some
subsections contain multiple offenses and thus contain more than one form of capital
murder).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Michie 1999).
4. 1975 Va. Acts, ch. 14, 15.
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I Va. CodeAnn. Subsection 18.2-31(1): The Willful, Deliberate, and Pre-
meditated Killing ofAny Person in the Commission ofAbduction, as Defined
in Section 18.2.48, When Such Abduction was Committed with
the Intent to Extort Money or a Pecuniary Benefit or with the Intent
to Defile the Victim of Such Abduction
The first subsection of section 18.2-31, enacted on February 14, 1975,
made the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the
commission of abduction, as defined in section 18.248,' when such abduc-
tion was committed with the intent to extort money or a pecuniary benefit,
one of the three original capital offenses in Virginia.6 The murder victim in
a subsection 18.2-31(1) offense can be "any person."7 This means that the
victim of the murder can be someone other than the victim of the aggra-
vated abduction predicate offense.8 The willful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing must also be "in the commission of" the abduction. 9 A killing "in the
commission of" can take place before, during, or after the predicate
offense. 0
The predicate offense in subsection 18.2-31(1) is an abduction as defined
in section 18.2-48. This section makes it a felony to abduct with the intent
to extort money or pecuniary benefit, or to abduct with the intent to defile
the abducted victim, or to abduct any child under sixteen years of age for
the purpose of prostitution." Abduction as a predicate to capital murder
under subsection 18.2-31(1) does not include the abduction of any child for
prostitution purposes." Abduction is defined in section 18.2-47 as "[a]ny
person, who, by force, intimidation or deception, and without legal justifica-
tion or excuse, seizes, takes, transports, detains or secretes the person of
another, with the intent to deprive such other person of his personal liberty
or to withhold or conceal him from any person, authority or institution
lawfully entitled to his charge .... " In order to commit the abduction
predicate under section 18.2-48, an individual must commit abduction as
defined in section 18.2-47 and intend to extort money or a pecuniary benefit
or intend to defile the victim of the abduction.
The Virginia courts have broadly interpreted the intent requirements
necessary to establish the underlying offense of abduction for purposes of
applying subsection 18.2-31(1). The capital murder requirement of intent
5. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.248 (Michie 1999).
6. 1975 Va. Acts, ch. 14, 15.
7. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(1) (Michie 1999).
8. Harward v. Commonwealth, 330 S.E.2d 89, 91 (Va. 1985).
9. S 18.2-31(1).
10. Harward, 330 S.E.2d at 91.
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to extort money or a pecuniary benefit does not require the abductor to
actually succeed in realizing his or her desired ends. 4 Only the intent to do
so is required." Although the primary objective in section 18.2-48 is to
punish traditional ransom killing, the courts have established an expansive
definition of the "extort money or pecuniary benefit" language in the
statute. 16 The requisite intent to extort money or pecuniary benefit has
been found where the defendant desired to obtain cancellation of a pre-
existing debt,' used hostages as human shields to facilitate escape from a
robbery scene,'" and even where the defendant obtained a free ride from the
victim. ,
The groundwork for the statutory expansion of the original subsection
18.2-31(1) came from the General Assembly of Virginia's enactment of
subsection 18.2-3 1(h) in 1985.20 The subsection made "the willful, deliberate
and premeditated killing of a child under the age of twelve years in the
commission of abduction as defined in S18.2-48 when such abduction was
committed with the intent to extort money or a pecuniary benefit, or with
the intent to defile the victim of such abduction" a capital offense. 21 Subsec-
tion 18.2-31(h) was strikingly similar to subsection 18.2-31 (1); subsection (h)
in fact only added an offense of abducting and intending to sexually molest
a child under twelve. The "killing of a child under the age of twelve years
in the commission of abduction" language most likely meant that the victim
of the abduction must also be the victim of the killing.'
In 1996, the General Assembly of Virginia combined the two abduction
subsections and by so doing expanded the capital murder statute.2, The
General Assembly struck the "killing of a child under the age of twelve
years" language of subsection eight and incorporated the "with the intent to
defile the victim of such abduction" phrase into subsection 18.2-31(1).24 The
1996 amendment expands the defilement or sexual molestation intent
requirement to any abductee and, thus, wholly incorporates the former
child abduction subsection into subsection 18.2-31(1). The subsection also
allows for the killing of "any person" in the commission of the abduction
14. Barnes v. Commonwealth, 360 S.E.2d 196, 201 (Va. 1987).
15. Id.
16. ROGER D. GROOT, CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND DEFENSES IN VIRGINIA: 5 (4th ed.
1998).
17. See Kent v. Commonwealth, 183 S.E. 177, 177-78 (Va. 1936).
18. See Cortner v. Commonwealth, 281 S.E.2d 908, 910 (Va. 1981).
19. See Krummert v. Commonwealth, 43 S.E. 2d 831, 833 (Va. 1947).
20. 1985 Va. Acts, ch. 428.
21. Id.
22. Harward v. Commonwealth, 330 S.E.2d 89, 91 (Va. 1985).
23. 1996 Va. Acts, ch. 876.
24. Id.
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
predicate offense. There is no longer any requirement that the abducted
child be the person slain.
The current text of subsection 18.2-31(1) is set out in the heading to this
section.
I. Va. Code Ann. Subsection 18.2-31(2): The Willful, Deliberate, and
Premeditated Killing ofAny Person by Anotherfor Hire
The second of the three original subsections in the 1975 enactment of
section 18.2-31 made the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of a
human being by another for hire a capital offense." This subsection was the
first in section 18.2-31 to make someone other than the slayer eligible for
the death penalty. In a subsection 18.2-31(2) crime, the Commonwealth can
seek capital murder convictions for any party to the slaying26 because
section 18.2-18 allows the actual killer, a principal in the second degree, or
an accessory before the fact to be convicted of capital murder.2" The person
who hires the killer will most likely be charged with capital murder under
subsection 18.2-31(2) as an accessory before the fact. To convict, the Com-
monwealth must prove the commission of the crime by the principal, the
accessory's absence at the commission of the offense, and that prior to the
crime the accessory was involved as an instigator, advisor, or contriver.28
The person who hires the killer may be a principal in the second degree if
that person is present at the crime's commission and either commits an
overt act such as inciting or advising in the commission of the crime or
shares in the perpetrator's criminal intent.29
The murder must of course be for hire. The requirements of the "for
hire" language are not clear"0 but generally, something of value must be
promised for the killing. For example, the "for hire" predicate offense can
be satisfied by a promise that the killer would receive part of the victim's life
insurance proceeds.3"
The General Assembly amended subsection 18.2-31(2) on March 29,
1977 by replacing the killing of "a human being" language with the killing
of "any person. "3' This change was most likely an effort by the General
Assembly to implement consistency in the statutory structure. Both subsec-
tions two and three were amended in 1977, by inserting "any person" into
25. 1975 Va. Acts, ch. 14, 15.
26. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-18 (Michie 1999).
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(10) (Michie 1999).
28. McGhee v. Commonwealth, 270 S.E.2d 729, 731 (Va. 1980).
29. See Moehring v. Commonwealth, 290 S.E.2d 891, 892 (Va. 1982).
30. GROOT, supra note 16, at 276.
31. See Fisher v. Commonwealth, 374 S.E.2d 46, 48 (Va. 1988).
32. 1977 Va. Acts, ch. 478.
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the statute. This made them consistent with subsections one and four of
section 18.2-31.
The current text of subsection 18.2-31(2) is set out in the heading to this
section.
IlL Va. Code Ann. Section 18.2-31(3): The Willful, Deliberate, and
Premeditated Killing ofAny Person by a Prisoner Confined
in a State or Local Correctional Facility as Defined in Section 53.1-1,
or While in the Custody of an Employee Thereof
The third subsection of the 1975 capital murder statute made the
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing by an inmate in a penal institu-
tion as defined in section 53-19.18, or while in the custody of an employee
thereof, a capital offense.33 A penal or correctional institution in section 53-
19.18 included every prison, prison camp, prison farm, or correctional field
unit that was established with state funds as well as every jail, jail farm, lock-
up, or other place of detention owned or operated by any political subdivi-
sion of the Commonwealth. 4 A prisoner who murders any person while
in the custody of an employee of a penal institution has also committed a
capital offense under section 18.2-31(3)." The "in the custody of an em-
ployee" language most likely refers to guards or correctional agents who
transport or supervise the prisoners when outside the correctional facility.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has declined to rule on the qualifications
and requirements necessary to either establish one as an employee of a
correctional facility or his ability to have custody of the prisoner. "
The first statutory amendment to section 18.2-31(3), like subsection
18.2-31(2), occurred on March 29, 1977, when the General Assembly added
the killing "of any person" by an inmate to the subsection. 37 Before this
amendment, the subsection did not specify a class of victims. The "any
person" language was adopted to clarify the class of victims included in the
subsection and also to maintain parallel statutory construction with subsec-
tions one and four. The 1977 amendment to subsection 18.2-31(3) made it
clear that the subsection did not apply just to the killing of a guard by an
inmate but a killing of anyone, including guards, visitors, employees, or
other inmates. In attempting to clarify the statute, the amendment widened
.the scope of the capital offense in subsection 18.2-31(3).
The next amendment to subsection 18.2-31(3) occurred on April 12,
1982, in which the "a prisoner confined in a state or local correctional
facility as defined in S 53.1-1" language replaced "an inmate in a penal
33. 1975 Va. Acts, ch. 14, 15.
34. 1974 Va. Acts, ch. 44, 45.
35. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(3) (Michie 1999).
36. Mu'min v. Commonwealth, 389 S.E.2d 886, 895 (Va. 1990).
37. 1977 Va. Acts, ch. 478.
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institution as defined in S 53-19.18."" This amendment was necessitated by
the repeal of section 53-19.18 and the enactment of its replacement, section
53.1-1.31 Instead of one general definition of penal institution, section 53.1-1
distinguishes between local and state correctional facilities.' According to
section 53.1-1, a local correctional facility means any jail, jail farm, or other
place used for the detention or incarceration of adult offenders, excluding
a lock-up.41 A state correctional facility means any correctional center or
correctional field unit used for the incarceration of adult offenders estab-
lished and operated by the Department of Corrections.42 The 1982 amend-
ment to subsection 18.2-31(3), in which the General Assembly divided the
term penal institution into two separate categories, local and state correc-
tional facilities, illustrates the rare occasion in which the capital murder
statute becomes narrower and more restrictive as a result of the amendment.
The principal effect of the adoption of section 53.1-1 is to exclude the lock-
up, juvenile facility, and half-way house from the scope of subsection 18.2-
31(3) because they are neither local nor state correctional facilities.43 There-
fore the 1982 amendment to subsection 18.2-31(3) will no longer allow the
premeditated killing of any person by a prisoner in a lock-up to be a capital
offense.
There are a few cases that shed light on the meaning and boundaries of
state and local correctional facilities. In Mu'min v. Commonwealth," the
defendant was a prisoner in a Virginia state correctional facility. The
defendant was transported to a work detail under the supervision of a
Virginia Department of Transportation employee.4" The defendant left the
work detail, entered a store, and killed the store clerk.' The defendant was
convicted of capital murder under subsection 18.2-31(3) and challenged the
conviction arguing that he was not confined in a state correctional facility
when the murder was committed.7 The Supreme Court of Virginia, in
dictum, agreed with the trial judge's jury instruction that an inmate of a state
correctional facility remains an inmate at all times until released from that
status by the proper state authority.48 The court relied on Ruffin v. Com-
38. 1982 Va. Acts, ch. 636.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-1 (Michie 1999).
42. Id.
43. GROOT, supra note 16, at 275.
44. 389 S.E.2d 886 (Va. 1990).
45. Mu'min v. Commonwealth, 389 S.E.2d 886, 889 (Va. 1990).
46. Id. at 890.
47. Id. at 894.
48. Id. at 894 n.7.
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monwealtb,49 in which the court held that a prisoner hired out to work on
a railroad was still a convict in the penitentiary despite not being physically
in the penitentiary when committing the murder.' Yet the Mu'min court
refused to decide whether the defendant's subsection 18.2-31(3) conviction
was proper because he was also convicted of capital murder under subsec-
tion 18.2-31(4).5 1 The reference to the Ruffin interpretation of a prisoner's
status is therefore dictum.
The Mu'min court also misapplied Ruffin. The Ruffin court used the
prisoner status concept in the context of interpreting a venue provision.
52
Therefore, Ruffin should have no application to the current capital murder
statute. The Mu'min court's flawed dictum also makes a portion of subsec-
tion 18.2-31(3) meaningless. If an individual, once incarcerated, is alwaysa
"prisoner confined in a state of local correctional facility" as the Mu'min
court suggested, then the "while in the custody of an employee thereof"
language is useless because the individual, regardless of his custody, will
always be a prisoner confined in a correctional facility. Because it makes a
part of subsection 18.2-31(3) meaningless, the Mu'min decision conflicts with
the well-established rule of statutory construction that "it is the duty of the
courts to give effect, if possible, to every Word of the written law.""3
The current text of sub section 18.2-31(3) is set out in the heading to this
section.
IV Va. Code Ann. Section 18.2.31(4): The Willful, Deliberate, and
Premeditated Killing ofAny Person in the Commission of
Robbery or Attempted Robbery
The first expansion of section 18.2-31 of the Virginia Code occurred
just one year after the General Assembly enacted the section. As originally
enacted, subsection 18.2-31(4) was the "willful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing of any person in the commission of robbery while armed with a
deadly weapon."' The murder victim in a subsection 18.2-31(4) offense can
be "any person."55 This means that the victim of the murder can be some-
one other than the victim of the robbery predicate offense.- The willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing must also be "in the commission of" the
49. 62 Va. (21 Gratt) 790 (1871).
50. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt) 790, 793-94 (1871).
51. Mu'min, 389 S.E.2d at 895.
52. Ruffin, 62 Va. (21 Gratt) at 792-93.
53. Moyer v. Commonwealth, No. 2959-97-2, 1999 WL 969706 (Va. Ct. App., Oct. 26,
1999) (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Burnette v. Commonwealth, 75 S.E.2d 482, 484-85
(Va. 1953)).
54. 1976 Va. Acts, ch. 503. The rape predicate was added at the same time.
55. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(4) (Michie 1999).
56. Harward v. Commonwealth, 330 S.E.2d 89,91 (Va. 1985).
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robbery. A killing "in the commission of" can take place before, during, or
after the predicate offense. 7 The crime of robbery is not defined in the
robbery statute, section 18.2-58 of the Virginia Code, because robbery in
Virginia is a common law offense."8 The common law definition of robbery
is "'the taking, with intent to steal, of the personal property of another,
from his person or in his presence, against his will, by violence or intimi-
dation.' ' s9 A killing "in the commission of robbery" raises issues about the
nexus between the killing and the robbery. These issues are fully explored
in another portion of this Symposium.
6
0
The first expansion of subsection 18.2-31(4) occurred on March 23,
1989, when the General Assembly added attempted robbery as a predicate
offense for capital murder.6' The original impetus for including attempted
robbery in subsection 18.2-31(4) came from the General Assembly's aware-
ness of the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in Ballv. Commonwealth.'
In Ball, the defendant entered a store armed with a gun and demanded
money from an assistant store manager.' A struggle ensued in which the
defendant shot and killed the assistant store manager.'4 The defendant failed
to take anything but nonetheless was charged and convicted under subsec-
tion 18.2-31(4). 6' The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the conviction
because the defendant had committed an attempted robbery and did not kill
in the commission of a completed robbery as was required by subsection
18.2-31(4). 66
The Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in Ball, with its correct
construction of subsection 18.2-31(4), may have annoyed the General
Assembly but it was not until the attempted robbery and murder of store
clerk Muhammad Ashraf Chaudhary in Henrico County on January 27,
1987, that the General Assembly eventually amended subsection 18.2-31(4)
to include attempted robbery.' Chaudhary was stabbed more than twenty
times during an attempted robbery in which the four perpetrators failed to
57. Id.
58. Pritchard v. Commonwealth, 303 S.E.2d 911, 912 (Va. 1983).
59. Id. (quoting Mason v. Commonwealth, 105 S.E.2d 149, 150 (Va. 1958)).
60. Heather L. Necklaus, Predicate Felonies in the Context of Capital Cases, CAP. DEF.
J. 37 (1999) (Part I this symposium).
61. 1989 Va. Acts, d. 527.
62. 273 S.E.2d 790 (Va. 1981).
63. Ball v. Commonwealth, 273 S.E.2d. 790, 791 (Va. 1981).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 792.
67. Jeanne Cummings, Axselle Finds Support For Broader Death Penalty, RICHMOND
TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 23, 1989, at 11.
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open the cash register and therefore were unable to take anything." All
four defendants received lengthy prison sentences. This prompted Delegate
Axselle of Henrico County to lobby for the inclusion of attempted robbery
in the capital murder statute.69 Delegate Axselle believed that there was
overwhelming support from his constituents for expanding the death
penalty to include attempted robbery after the murder of Chaudhary.0 He
introduced the bill in mid-January of 1989.71 . The General Assembly
amended subsection 18.2-31(4) to include attempted robbery on March 23,
1989.2
On March 6, 1996, the Virginia Senate initiated a second major change
to subsection 18.2-31(4) by passing a bill that removed the "while armed
with a deadly weapon" language from the statute. The legislature's
motivation for removing the weapon requirement from the statute can
probably be traced to the Supreme Court of Virginia's analysis of a "deadly
weapon" in Quintana v. Commonweal. 73 In Quintana, the defendant was
convicted under subsection 18.2-31(4) for murdering an elderly woman by
striking her several times with a hammer obtained at the scene and then
taking her belongings.74 On appeal, the defendant argued that the hammer
was not a deadly weapon.7 The court stated that a weapon can be deadly
per se or as used and then ruled that the weapon in the case was deadly as
used. 6 Although the court ruled that the hammer as used was a deadly
weapon and affirmed the death sentence," this definition of a deadly
weapon could have become problematic for the Commonwealth. On April
17, 1996, the General Assembly removed the "while armed with a deadly
weapon" language from section 18.2-31(4),78 probably to avoid the as
used/per se issue. The 1996 amendment to subsection 18.2-31(4) expanded
the scope of the capital offense by removing an entire element from the
subsection.






72. 1989 Va. Acts, ch. 527.
73. 295 S.E.2d 643 (Va. 1982).
74. Quintana v. Commonwealth, 295 S.E.2d 643, 645 (Va. 1982).
75. Id. at 649.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 1996 Va. Acts, ch. 959.
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V Va. Code Ann. Section 18.2-31(5): Tbe Willful, Deliberate, and
Premeditated Killing ofAny Person in the Commission of,
or Subsequent to, Rape or Attempted Rape, Forcible Sodomy
or Attempted Forcible Sodomy or Object Sexual Penetration
In 1976, the General Assembly added subsection 18.2-31(5)." At that
time the subsection made the "willful, deliberate and premeditated killing
of a person during the commission of, or subsequent to a rape" a capital
offense.' The General Assembly has amended and altered this subsection
more than any other provision in the capital murder statute. To obtain a
conviction under section 18.2-31(5), the Commonwealth must prove the
elements of one of the sex offenses as defined in the relevant code section.
Rape
Rape is defined in S 18.2-61." The Virginia legislature has defined non-
marital rape as sexual intercourse with any other person "against the
complaining witness's will, by force, threat or intimidation" or "through the
use of the complaining witness's mental incapacity or physical
helplessness." 2
The 1976 version of subsection 18.2-31(5) had a narrower construction
than subsection 18.2-31(4), the robbery predicate offense. Subsection 18.2-
31(5) referred to the killing of "a person during the commission of, or
subsequent to, rape" whereas subsection 18.2-31(4) referred to the killing of
"any person in the commission of robbery."83 The significance of the
statutory language in section 18.2-31(5) was addressed by the Supreme Court
of Virginia in Harward v. Commonwealth. 4 The Harward decision would
initiate the first of several amendments to section 18.2-31(5) by the General
Assembly.
In Harward, the defendant broke into the home of a married couple.
The defendant struck the husband several times with a crowbar in order to
render him unconscious to facilitate the rape of the wife. 6 The defendant
raped the wife twice and then left.' When the police arrived, the husband
was dead as a result of the multiple blows to the head inflicted upon him by
79. 1976 Va. Acts, ch. 503.
80. Id.
81. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-61 (Michie 1999).
82. Id.
83. 1976 Va. Acts, ch. 503.
84. 330 S.E.2d 89 (Va. 1985).
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the defendant.8 The defendant was convicted of capital murder under
section 18.2-31(5) and received a sentence of life in prison. 9 On appeal, the
defendant argued that he could not be convicted under section 18.2-31(5)
because the person killed during the commission of or subsequent to the
rape must be the victim of the rape.*
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the defendant's contention
and, applying the rule of strict construction, held that section. 1.8.2-31(5)
only proscribed the murder of the rape victim and could not be extended to
include the murder of another.91 The court based its decision on a word-for-
word comparison between section 18.2-31(5) and the other subsections of
the statute. The Court found the "any person" language in subsections one
and four of section 18.2-31 and the "a person" language in subsection five of
the statute to be particularly noteworthy.' The court stated that "any"
includes all and that "a" is limited to one.93 The court also noted that the
"during the commission of, or subsequent to, rape" language established a
narrower time frame than the "in the commission of" language found in
subsections one and four of section 18.2-31. The latter includes a killing
before, during or after the predicate offense, while the former excludes a
killing that occurs before a rape.9" This distinction was important in the
court's analysis because of the order of Harward's offenses and the more
restrictive language in subsection five; both supported the contention that
the person killed must be the rape victim.9"
On April 4, 1988, the General Assembly of Virginia responded to
Harward by replacing the "a person" and "during the commission" language
relied on by the court, with the "any person" and "in the commission"
language used in subsections one and four of section 18.2-31. The 1988
amendment to section 18.2-31(5) expanded the capital offense to include the
killing of anyone; therefore, the rape of one victim and the murder of
another victim could sustain a conviction under the subsection.' The 1988
amendment also expanded the temporal requirement of the offense by
including the "in the commission" language. As the Supreme Court of









96. 1988 Va. Acts, ch. 550.
97. GROOT, supra note 16, at 275.
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place before, during, or after the predicate offense.9" The amended section
18.2-31(5) makes it a capital offense to kill someone and then commit a
rape." Strangely, the General Assembly of Virginia kept the "or subsequent
to" language in the subsection. Based on Harward, it is included in the "in
the commission of" language. Thus, the "or subsequent to" phrase is
extraneous.
There is no doubt that the 1988 amendment to section 18.2-31(5) was
intended by the legislature to overturn the court's ruling in Harward. The
General Assembly wanted to ensure that a Harward scenario was a capital
offense, not only by including the killing of someone other than the rape
victim in the statutory language, but also by including the killing of
someone before the rape. This latter inclusion is important because if the
defendant in Harward had killed the husband before the rape, the defendant
would not have been within the scope of pre-1988 section 18.2-31(5).
Although the scope of section 18.2-31(5) had been greatly expanded
with the enactment of the 1988 amendment, the General Assembly of
Virginia has continued to expand the subsection. The 1989 House bill
introduced by Delegate Axselle to expand subsection four of section 18.2-31
by including attempted robbery as a predicate offense inspired Senator
Saslaw of Fairfax County to propose a bill that would make attempted rape
a predicate offense under subsection five of section 18.2-31. 00 The
"attempted rape" bill proposed by Senator Saslaw, who was running for
lieutenant governor the same year this legislation was introduced, 10 1 passed
both houses of the legislature and was enacted into law with the "attempted
robbery" bill on March 23, 1989.12 This amendment makes it unnecessary
for the Commonwealth to prove that the rape has been completed.
Forcible Sodomy
The General Assembly further amended section 18.2-31(5) on March
15, 1991, by adding forcible sodomy and attempted forcible sodomy as
predicate offenses for capital murder.103 This amendment, like the 1989
"attempted rape" amendment to section 18.2-31(5), was an effort to
legislatively expand the scope of the death penalty from the predicate
offense of rape to all forms of sexual assault. Before the 1991 amendment,
the Virginia courts had struggled to draw the line between rape and sodomy
in the capital murder context. This struggle was nowhere more apparent
98. Harward, 330 S.E.2d at 91.
99. GROOT, supra note 16, at 275.
100. Michael Martz, Both Chambers Back Tougher Crime Lams, RICHMOND TimES-
DISPATCH, Feb. 7, 1989, at 7.
101. Id.
102. 1989 Va. Acts, ch. 527.
103. 1991 Va. Acts, ch. 232.
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than 'in the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in Tuggle v.
Commonwealth.'"4
In Tuggle, the defendant was charged and convicted under section 18.2-
31(5) for the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of the victim in the
commission of rape. 15 The defendant argued on appeal that the
Commonwealth failed to establish sexual intercourse."°  The
Commonwealth based its rape charge on evidence that the victim's clothes
had been pulled off, numerous abrasions, contusions, a bite mark on the
breast, injury to the vaginal vault, and semen found in the victim's
rectum. 7 The defendant argued that none of this evidence proved rape.108
The Supreme Court of Virginia found that the Commonwealth had proved
sexual intercourse because no evidence "reasonably suggests penetration of
the victim's vagina by an object other than the defendant's penis.""°'
Although Tuggle set the stage for the 1991 amendment expanding
capital murder to include the forcible sodomy predicate, two murders in
Prince William County in which the defendants sodomized their victims
ultimately sparked the legislation that directly led to the 1991 amendment.,1 0
In both cases, the defendants took small amounts of money from their
victims and therefore were eligible for the death penalty under subsection
18.2-31(4), but would not have been eligible for the death penalty for having
committed sodomy.11'
Senator Saslaw of Fairfax County, who introduced the 1989
amendment to subsection 18.2-31(5), also introduced the bill that added
forcible sodomy and attempted forcible sodomy to the subsection."'
Senator Saslaw wanted to expand the subsection to include forcible sodomy
in order to dose what he saw as a loophole in the law in which perpetrators
of rape were eligible for the death penalty but perpetrators of forcible
sodomy were not."' Senator Saslaw's bill, designed to further expand the
application of the capital murder statute, was easily approved by the
legislature." 4 After the 1991 amendment, rape, attempted rape, forcible
104. 323 S.E.2d 534 (Va. 1984).
105. Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 539, 543 (Va. 1984).
106. Id. at 549.
107. Id. "
108. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (Michie 1999).
109. Necklaus, infra Part II of this Symposium.
110. Bruce Potter, Panel Advances Bill to Expand Death Penalty, RICHMOND TIMES-




114. Wilder Signs Bill Expanding Death Penalty, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar.20,
1991, at 5.
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On March 16, 1995, the General Assembly of Virginia made object
sexual penetration the fifth predicate offense in subsection 18.2-31(5).16
Object sexual penetration, as, defined in section 18.2-67.2, occurs when the
accused uses force, threat, or intimidation against a complaining witness and
penetrates the labia majora or anus of the complaining witness, or causes the
complaining witness to penetrate the accused's body with an object, or
causes the complaining witness to engage in such acts with any other person
or animal."7 Object sexual penetration in section 18.2-67.2 originally
applied to only inanimate objects but was later expanded in 1993 to include
both animate and inanimate objects."1 The inclusion of an animate object
effecting sexual penetration also expanded the scope of activity punishable
under subsection 18.2-31(5). The object sexual penetration must be
completed for a subsection 18.2-31(5) conviction because the statute does not
currently make an attempted object sexual penetration a capital offense." 9
Payne v. Commonwealtb
In Payne v. Commonwealtb,20 the defendant challenged the imposition
of more than one death sentence for each victim he killed.'' The defendant
was convicted of capital murder under both subsections four and five of
section 18.2-31 for the murder of one of his victims.'22 The court ruled that
the two subsections were distinct statutory2 provisions and therefore the
defendant could be convicted under both.2 But the court extended this
rationale to the second murder committed by the defendant in which he was
given two capital murder sentences for violating subsection 18.2-31(5).124
The defendant received capital murder sentences for both the killing in the
commission of attempted rape and the killing in the commission of object
115. 1991 Va. Acts, ch. 232.
116. 1995 Va. Acts, ch. 340.
117. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-67.2 (Micie 1999).
118. 1993 Va. Acts, ch. 549.
119. Neckaus, infra Part II of this Symposium.
120. 509 S.E.2d 293 (Va. 1999).
121. Payne v. Commonwealth, 509 S.E.2d 293, 300 (Va. 1999).
122. Id. at 296.
123. Id. at 301.
124. Id.
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sexual penetration of the one victim. 12 Although the two capital murder
sentences were based upon one subsection, the court. ruled that the
defendant had violated two distinct statutory provisions of subsection 18.2-
31(5) and had therefore committed two capital offenses.
1 26
The Payne decision greatly expanded the capital murder statute by
allowing several capital offenses to be contained in each subsection of
section 18.2-3 1. After Payne, section 18.2-31 can be construed to have more
than twelve and possibly as many as twenty-seven distinct statutory capital
provisions.
27
The current text of subsection 18.2-31(5) is set out in the heading to this
section.
VI Va. Code Ann. Subsection 18.2.31(6): The WillfI, Deliberate, and
Premeditated Killing of a Law enforcement Officer as Defined in
Section 9-169 (9) or Any Law enforcement Officer ofAnother State or the
United States Having the Power to Arrest/or a Felony under the Laws of
Such State or the United States, Wben Such Killing is for the Purpose of
Interfering wvith the Performance of His Official Duties
On March 29, 1977, the General Assembly of Virginia enacted
subsection 18.2-31(6), which made the willful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing of a law enforcement officer a capital offense when such killing is for
the purpose of interfering with the performance of his official duties. This
subsection was added to the capital murder statute to punish those who kill
law enforcement officers in the line of duty. To be convicted under
subsection 18.2-31(6), the defendant must have acted for the purpose of
interfering with the performance of the law enforcement officer's official
duties.' " There is no requirement that the slain law enforcement officer
actually be performing official duties,' but the defendant must be aware
that his victim was a law enforcement officer.' It may be difficult for the
defendant to know who is a law enforcement officer because the definition
eventually applied to that term exceeds its ordinary meaning.
When subsection 18.2-31(6) was enacted in 1977, "law enforcement
officer" was narrowly defined under section 9-108"' as a full-time employee
of a police department or sheriff's office administered by the State,
125. Id. at 298.
126. Id. at 301.
127. Alix M. Karl, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 455 (1998) (analyzing Payne, 509 S.E.2d
293).
128. 1977 Va. Acts, ch. 478.
129. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 271 S.E.2d 123, 126 (Va. 1980).
130. See Delong v. Commonwealth, 362 S.E.2d 669, 676 (Va. 1987).
131. Id.
132. VA. CODE ANN. S 9-108 (Michie 1973).
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responsible for the prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement
of penal, traffic, or highway laws of the State."' In 1976, the General
Assembly repealed section 9-108 and in its place adopted section 9-108. (1H)
which originally mirrored the language of repealed section 9-108.'4 In 1977,
the General Assembly amended section 9-108.1(H) by adding Alcoholic
Beverage Control Commission inspectors vested with police authority to
the definition of "law enforcement officer."' The General Assembly
included the expanded definition of a law enforcement officer under section
9-108.1(H) in the 1979 amendment to subsection 18.2-31(6).136
The next major change in the definition of a law enforcement officer
occurred on April 2, 1981, when the General Assembly repealed section 9-
108.1(H) and replaced it with section 9-169(9).137 The new definition of a
law enforcement officer in section 9-169(9) included the section 9-108. 1(H)
language and added any police agent appointed under the provisions of
section 56-353."' A police agent under section 56-353 is appointed by the
president or any other executive officer of any railroad company
incorporated by the Commonwealth to preserve the peace and enforce the
law." The statutory expansion of section 9-169(9) did not stop with the
inclusion of Alcohol Beverage Control agents and railroad police. The
history of section 9-169(9) is one of growth and inclusion of and to the "law
enforcement officer" definition. With every addition to section 9-169(9), the
scope of subsection 18.2-31(6) is widened and the death penalty applied more
broadly. On March 15, 1983, the General Assembly amended subsection
18.2-31(6) by replacing the repealed section 9-108. 1(H) with section 9-169(9)
and thereby officially expanding the definition of "law enforcement
officer."
The General Assembly again amended section 9-169(9) on March 25,
1983, by including any game warden who is a full-time sworn member of
the enforcement division of the Commission of Game and Inland Fisheries
in the definition of a "law enforcement officer." 4' The 1982 and 1983
amendments to section 9-169(9) all added separate classes of individuals to
the "law enforcement officer" definition but the General Assembly's
amendment on March 9, 1989, ushered in a more sweeping expansion of
133. 1968 Va. Acts, ch. 740.
134. 1976 Va. Acts, ch. 771.
135. 1977 Va. Acts, ch. 357.
136. 1979 Va. Acts, ch. 582.
137. 1981 Va. Acts, ch. 632.
138. Id.
139. VA. CODE ANN. S 56-353 (Michie 1999).
140. 1983 Va. Acts, ch. 175.
141. 1983 Va. Acts, ch. 357.
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section 9-169(9). It included any part-time employee of a police department
or sheriff's office to the definition.142
On March 20, 1991, the General Assembly of Virginia added officers
of the Virginia Marine Patrol to the section 9-169(9) definition. 43 The
following year, full-time members of the State Lottery Department security
division became law enforcement officers under section 9-169(9).1" In 1993,
the General Assembly added two more groups to section 9-169(9):
Department of Motor Vehicle enforcement officers when fulfilling duties
pursuant to section 46.2-217115 and any agent, investigator, or inspector
appointed under section 56-334.'46 According to section 46.2-217,
enforcement members of the Department of Motor Vehicles are those
authorized to enforce the criminal laws of the Commonwealth.147 Agents,
investigators, and inspectors under section 56-334 were individuals
appointed by the Department of State Police to enforce the laws and
regulations governing the operation of motor vehicles on the highways of
the Commonwealth. 4 In 1995, the General Assembly repealed section 56-
334149 but has not removed the section 56-334 language from section 9-
169(9).
From 1977 to 1993, there was a phenomenal expansion in the meaning
of a "law enforcement officer." In section 9-108(H), the statutory
predecessor of section 9-169(9), a law enforcement officer was a full-time
police officer. The succession of statutory amendments within this six year
period to both section 9-108() and section 9-169(9) reflected the General
Assembly's desire to denominate various state agents and officials as law
enforcement officers. Whatever was intended by these amendments, each
expanded the reach of capital murder under subsection six of 18.2-31.
As remarkable as the rapid expansion of section 9-169 (9) is, the General
Assembly of Virginia's amendment to subsection 18.2-31(6) in 1997 is by far
the most dramatic and dynamic expansion of the capital murder offense.
On March 11, 1997, the General Assembly added "any law enforcement
officer of another state or the United States having the power to arrest for
a felony under the laws of such state or the United States" to the class of
potential victims. The significance of the 1997 amendment is the dramatic
increase in the scope of who qualifies as a victim under the subsection. The
1997 amendment altered subsection 18.2-31(6) from a statute designed to
142. 1989 Va. Acts, ch. 233.
143. 1991 Va. Acts, ch. 338.
144. 1992 Va. Acts, ch. 422.
145. VA. CODE ANN. S 46.2-217 (Michie 1999).
146. 1950 Va. Acts, ch. 357; 1993 Va. Acts, ch. 533.
147. § 46.2-217.
148. 1993 Va. Acts, ch. 533.
149. 1995 Va. Acts, ch. 744, 803.
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prevent or punish individuals who kill Virginia police or state agents to a
statute under which the death penalty applies to the killing of virtually all
law enforcement officers whether employed by Virginia, other states, or the
United States."1°
The current text of subsection 18.2-31(6) is set out in the heading to this
section.
VII. Va. Code Ann. Subsection 18.2-31(7): The Willful, Deliberate, and
Premeditated Killing of More than One Person as a Part of the
Same Act or Transaction
On April 1, 1981, the General Assembly of Virginia enacted subsection
18.2-31(7), set out above. There are two gradation elements in subsection
18.2-31(7). Murder under subsection 18.2-31(7) requires a second willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing and both killings must occur as "part of
the same act or transaction."
152
The second willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing elevates the
initial premeditated murder to capital murder."' Therefore, the defendant
receives capital punishment for the first premeditated murder and not the
second murder. Although both killings in a subsection 18.2-31(7) charge
must be premeditated murders, the defendant need not be the actual slayer
of the second murder victim." The "triggerman rule," section 18.2-18,
applies to capital murder under subsection 18.2-31(7). The defendant need
only be the actual killer in the principal murder charged and at least an
accomplice in the murder of the other victim. 5
In Woodfin v. Commonwealth," the Supreme Court of Virginia
elaborated on the requirement that the series of murders be part of the same
act or transaction. The court noted that the "part of the same act or
transaction" language is synonymous with "same criminal episode." 17 The
court further defined the "same act or transaction" element in terms of a
temporal nexus: the slaying must be so closely connected "in time, place and
circumstance that a complete account of one charge cannot be related
without relating details of the other charge."5 ' The temporal nexus
150. 1997 Va. Acts, ch. 235.
151. 1981 Va. Acts, ch. 607.
152. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(7) (MVichie 1999).
153. GROOT, supra note 16, at 276.
154. See Graham v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 128, 130 (Va. 1995).
155. Id.
156. 372 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 1988).
157. Woodfm v. Commonwealth, 372 S.E.2d 377, 379 (Va. 1988).
158. Id. (quoting State v. Fitzgerald, 516 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Or. 1973)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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requirement makes subsection 18.2-31(7) a "mass murder" subsection rather
than a "serial murder" one. 159
The manner in which a defendant is charged under subsection 18.2-
31(7) will affect sentencing consequences and possible convictions. In Morris
v. Commonwealth,1" the court held that a single count of subsection 18.2-
.31(7) will support only one penalty, despite its basis in two premeditated
killings.16 ' The reasoning behind Morris is that the two murders only prove
one capital murder, which means only one penalty, either death or capital
life, is possible. 62 In one case, a single count alleging both capital murder
under subsection 18.2-31(7) and first degree murders for killings in the same
transaction was sufficient to support capital and first degree convictions.
63
The more common method to obtain multiple convictions is to charge
capital murder in one count and the other premeditated murders in separate
counts."
The current text of subsection 18.2-31(7) is set out in the heading to this
section.
VIII. Va. Code Ann. Subsection 18.2-31(8): The Willful, Deliberate, and
Premeditated Killing of More than One Person Within a Three-year Period
The original sponsor of subsection 18.2-31(8), set out above, was
Senator Saslaw of Fairfax County, 6" the sponsor of several section 18.2-31
statutory expansions. Senator Saslaw introduced the bill in 1991 in response
to the killings of three prostitutes in Arlington County by a man who was
ineligible for the death penalty.'66 On April 17, 1996, the General Assembly
of Virginia added subsection eight, which makes the willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing of more than one person within a three-year period a
capital offense. 67 The subsection 18.2-31(8) language is similar to subsection
18.2-31(7); the only difference between the two is the temporal nexus
requirement. A conviction under subsection 18.2-31(8) does not require any
connection or "same act or transaction" between the murders, but the
murders must occur within the three-year time period.16 Assuming that the
Supreme Court of Virginia will apply the manner in which defendants are
159. See VA..CODE ANN. 5 18.2-31(8) (Michie 1999) (covering "serial murder").
160. 321 S.E.2d 633 (Va. 1984).
161. Morris v. Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d 633, 635 (Va. 1984).
162. GROOT, supra note 16, at 276.
163. See Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 757, 762 (Va. 1989).
164. GROOT, supra note 16, at 277.
165. Bruce Potter, Panel Advances Bill to Expand Death Penalty, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, Feb. 18, 1991 at 9.
166. Id.
167. 1996 Va. Acts, ch. 959.
168. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(8) (Michie 1999).
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charged under subsection seven to subsection eight, two premeditated
killings within a three-year period will support only one capital murder
conviction.1 69 Like subsection seven, both murders must be premeditated.
The triggerman rule, section 18.2-18, applies to subsection 18.2-31(8)," To but
it is not clear if the capital defendant must be the actual slayer in each
murder charged.
Senator Saslaw's original serial murder bill was rejected by the House
Courts of Justice Committee because of a disagreement over the definition
of a serial killer.'' However, five years later the General Assembly passed
the bill into law. If the legislature intended subsection 18.2-31(8) to punish
only serial killers, using that subsection to charge what have been subsection
18.2-31(7) offenses should not be permitted. The "same act or transaction"
will always be subsumed in the three year period. Yet there is a difference
between mass murder and serial murder. It is unclear whether subsections
seven and eight can be used interchangeably for the killing of multiple
victims in a single act or transaction. If both subsections can be used for
"mass murders," then subsection 18.2-31(7) becomes a dead letter because the
Commonwealth can simply charge and convict under subsection 18.2-31(8).
The current text of subsection 18.2-31(8) is set out in the heading to this
section.
IX. Va. Code Ann. Subsection 18.2-31(9). The Willful, Deliberate, and
Premeditated Killing ofAny Person in the Commission of or Attempted
Commission of a Violation of Section 18.2-248, Involving a Schedule I or II
Controlled Substance, When Such Killing is for the Purpose of Furthering
the Commission or Attempted Commission of Such Violation
In 1990, the General Assembly added subsection nine to section 18.2-
31.172 That subsection is set out above. The predicate offense of subsection
18.2-31(9) that elevates the premeditated murder to capital murder is the
"commission of or attempted commission of a violation of section 18.2-
248."' Under section 18.2-248, it is an offense to manufacture, sell, give,
169. GROOT, supra note 16, at 277.
170. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-18 (Michie 1999).
171. Potter, supra note 165.
172. 1990 Va. Acts, ch. 746.
173. In a capital murder under subsection nine, a premeditated murder combined with
a drug offense becomes a capital murder if the reason for the killing is to further the drug
offense or attempted drug offense. Without this purpose for the killing, the premeditated
murder is a first degree murder. Capital murder under subsection nine differs from other
capital felony murders in which a murder combined with predicate felony (robbery, rape,
forcible sodomy, attempted robbery, rape or forcible sodomy, and object sexual penetration)
becomes a capital offense upon the existence of premeditation. Without the premeditation,
the murder with predicate felony is treated as a first degree crime. An unpremeditated killing
in the commission of a drug offense is second degree murder. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-33
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distribute, or possess with the intent to manufacture, sell, give, or distribute
a controlled substance.17 The predicate offense in subsection 18.2-31(9)
covers the entire spectrum of drug manufacture and distribution activity,
including attempts to engage in drug activity.7" Therefore, the actual
completion of a section 18.2-248 offense is not required to satisfy the broad
subsection 18.2-31(9) predicate offense.
The one limitation to the expansive section 18.2-248 predicate offense
is that the relevant "controlled substance" must be a "Schedule I or II
controlled substance." Schedule I and Schedule H controlled substances are
listed in sections 54.1-344617' and 54.1-3448,'77 respectively. Although
numerous drugs are listed in the schedules, the most common Schedule I
drug is heroin and the most common Schedule II drug is cocaine. 178 It is not
a capital offense to kill any person in the commission of a section 18.2-248
offense if the drug involved is not listed in one of the two schedules.
79
Another requirement for the capital murder offense in subsection 18.2-
31(9) is that the "killing is for the purpose of furthering the commission or
attempted commission of [a section 18.2-248] violation."' 0 The "purpose"
requirement is similar to that of subsection 18.2-31(6) and probably has the
same meaning.' 8 ' If so, the killer need not actually further the commission
of the section 18.2-248 crime by committing the murder. The "purpose"
requirement is satisfied if the killer believes and perceives that the killing
will further the commission of the violation, even if the victim's death in no
way furthers the crime.'82
The victim of the subsection 18.2-31(9) murder can be "any person." "
The murder victim need not have participated or been involved in the
section 18.2-248 predicate offense. 8 But as the killing must be for the
"purpose of furthering" the commission of section 18.2-248, in that the
defendant must view the killing of the victim as somehow furthering the
drug activity. Similar to other subsections, the "in the commission of or
(Michie 1999).
174. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-248 (Michie 1999).
175. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(9) (Michie 1999).
176. VA. CODE ANN. S 54.1-3446 (Michie 1999).
177. VA. CODE ANN. S 54.1-3448 (Michie 1999).
178. GROOT, supra note 16, at 275.
179. This is second degree murder. See supra note 173; VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-33
(Michie 1999).
180. §18.2-31(9).
181. GROOT, supra note 16, at 275.
182. See Delong v. Commonwealth, 362 S.E.2d 669, 676 (Va. 1987).
183. S18.2-31(9).
184. Harward v. Commonwealth, 330 S.E.2d 89, 91 (Va. 1985).
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attempted commission of" temporal requirement means that the killing can
take place before, during or after the predicate offense.'
The General Assembly enacted subsection 18.2-31(9) in an attempt to
confront and address the rising level of violence from the "crack epidemic"
of the 1980's. The "death penalty for drug dealers" bill was an effort by
legislators from Richmond concerned about the drug-related murders in that
city."8 6 The General Assembly also passed the legislation to take advantage
of the political benefit in appearing tough on drugs and drug-related crime. 87
In 1990, the bill was sponsored by freshman Delegate Eck of Richmond
and strongly supported by then-Governor Wilder. Delegate Eck used the
expansion of the death penalty as a political issue and had vowed to
introduce this capital murder legislation if elected.S' According to Delegate
Eck, the bill was introduced to curb the drug-related murders plaguing
Richmond, in which thirty out of the city's 102 murders in 1989 were
linked to drugs.8 9 Delegate Eck believed that the capital murder legislation
would remedy the drug-related violence that was "destroying the fabric of
society.""9° On a less dramatic and more pragmatic tone, Delegate Eck
noted that his bill could be used by prosecutors as a plea bargaining tool, to
persuade perpetrators to cooperate in an investigation or face possible capital
punishment.91
The bill that would eventually gain strong support from both houses
of the General Assembly was initially delayed by a political battle between
Delegate Cranwell of Roanoke County and Senator Stallings of Virginia
Beach. When Delegate Cranwell, who co-wrote the drug dealer-capital
murder bill, moved to place Senator Stallings gun liability bill off the table,
Senator Stallings responded by moving to delay the vote on the death
penalty bill.' This gamesmanship between the two politicians lasted for
several days but eventually gave way to allow passage of the bill by the
General Assembly. The legislative history of subsection nine of section
18.2-31 illustrates the disturbing use of death as a bargaining chip in Virginia
politics.
185. Id.
186. Olivia Winslow, Legislaton' Bills Posed to Fight Drug War in State, RICHMOND
TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 25, 1990, at C4.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Michael Hardy, Death Penalty Bill is Taken Hostage, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Mar. 2, 1990, at A8.
190. Id.
191. Winslow, supra note 186, at C4.
192. Michael Martz, Drug-Related Death Penalty Bill Idles in Political Hostage. Taking,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 26, 1990, at 5.
193. Id.
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The current text of subsection 18.2-31(9) is set out in the heading to this
section.
X. Va. Code Ann. Subsection 18.2.31(10): The Willful, Deliberate, and
Premeditated Killing ofAny Person by Another Pursuant to the Direction or
Order of One Who is Engaged in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise
as Defined in Subsection I of Section 18.2-248
On March 13, 1997, the General Assembly of Virginia added subsection
ten to section 18.2-31. "" Subsection ten is set out above. The structure of
subsection ten is similar to the murder for hire subsection"19 in that both
require a victim, a slayer, and a director."a The killing of "any person"
refers to the victim, "by another" refers to the slayer, and "pursuant to the
direction or order of one who is engaged in a continuing criminal enter-
prise" refers to the director of the killing. Another similarity between these
two subsections is that principals in the second degree as well as accessories
before the fact can be convicted of capital murder) " This exception to the
triggerman rule allows the person who orders the killing, an accessory
before the fact, to face capital punishment.
A premeditated murder becomes capital murder under subsection 18.2-
31(10) if the killer acts on the direction or order of one engaged in a continu-
ing criminal enterprise.'98 It appears that the actual killer need not be
involved in the continuing criminal enterprise but that the person who
directs or orders the killing must be involved to sustain a subsection 18.2-
31(10) conviction.'9" The person who directs or orders the killing must be
engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise as defined in subsection I of
section 18.2-248.2" The manufacturing, selling, giving, distributing, or
possessing with intent to manufacture, sell, give, or distribute a controlled
substance or an imitation controlled substance is prohibited under section
18.2-248 °20
Subsection I of section 18.2-248 defines a continuing criminal enterprise
in the context of a "drug kingpin." 2 Under this statute, a person is in-
volved in a continuing criminal enterprise if he commits violations of
section 18.2-248 that are a part of a "continuing series of violations of this
section" which are undertaken by the person with five or more other
194. 1997 Va. Acts, ch. 313.
195. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(2) (Michie 1999).
196. GROOT, supra note 16, at 277.
197. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-18 (Michie 1999).
198. GROOT, supra note 16, at 277.
199. Id.
200. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(10) (Michie 1999).
201. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-248 (Michie 1999).
202. S 18.2-248(H).
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people, to whom that person is in a supervisory, organizing, or management
position and from which the person obtains substantial income or
resources. 3 From the continuing criminal enterprise definition in subsec-
tion I of section 18.2-248, subsection 18.2-31(10) is limited to drug kingpins
and high ranking members of drug syndicates who order others to kill.
There is no requirement that the individual killed be a target of or related
to the kingpin's drug activities.
The General Assembly's enactment of subsection 18.2-31(10) in 1997
was the second attempt to respond to and deal with the murders caused by
drug activity. The first salvo came in the form of subsection 18.2-31(9),
making it a capital offense to kill someone in furtherance of drug activity."
In adding subsection ten to the capital murder statute, the General Assembly
followed the lead of the federal government which had enacted the Federal
Death Penalty Act of -1994.25 That statute made it a capital offense for an
individual to violate the Controlled Substances Act2°6 as part of a continuing
criminal enterprise offense in which the defendant is a "principal administra-
tor, organizer, or leader of such an enterprise, and the defendant, in order
to obstruct the investigation or prosecution of the enterprise or an offense
involved in the enterprise, attempts to kill or knowingly directs, advises,
authorizes, or assists another to attempt to kill any public officer, juror,
witness, or members of the family or household of such a person."207
Although the General Assembly of Virginia may have been inspired by
18 U.S.C. S 3591(b)(2) in enacting subsection 18.2-31(10), there are some
striking differences between the two statutes. The federal death penalty
provision closely tailors the victim category of 18 U.S.C. S 3591 to include
public officers, jurors, witnesses, and their family members. The statute is
designed to specifically protect executive and judicial processes. The aim of
the federal statute is to discourage the drug syndicates from obstructing
justice by ordering others to kill those involved in bringing the defendants
to justice.
The Virginia statute, subsection 18.2-31(10), has no specific class of
victims, and applies broadly to "any person" killed. The language in the
statute is much broader and more general than the language in 18 U.S.C. 5
3591(b)(2), even though the General Assembly used the federal legislation
as its model for subsection ten. This reflects the General Assembly's perpet-
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The current text of subsection 18.2-31(10) is set out in the heading to
this section.
XI. Va. Code Ann. Subsection 18.2-31(11): The Willful, Deliberate and
Premeditated Killing of a Pregnant Woman by One Who Knows That the
Woman is Pregnant and has the Intent to Cause the Involuntary
Termination of the Woman's Pregnancy Without a Live Birth
On March 22,1997, the General Assembly of Virginia added subsection
eleven to the capital murder statute." 8 That subsection is set out above.
There are three requirements in a subsection 18.2-31(11) capital murder.
The victim in the premeditated killing must be a pregnant woman. The
killer must know that the victim is pregnant. The killer must intend to
cause the involuntary termination of the woman's pregnancy without a live
birth. There is no requirement for the death of or injury to the fetus.2"
The killer must only intend to terminate the pregnancy and can be con-
victed under subsection 18.2-3 i(11) even if the fetus is unharmed.
Subsection 18.2-31 (11) was enacted along with two other provisions in
a comprehensive statutory scheme meant to punish, at several levels, those
who kill or cause injury to a pregnant woman with the intention to cause
the involuntary termination of the pregnancy.210 The premeditated murder
of a pregnant woman by one who knows the victim is pregnant and acts
with the intent to terminate the pregnancy, of course, commits a capital
murder under subsection 18.2-31 (11). The General Assembly also addressed
the non-premeditated murder of a pregnant woman in section 18.2-32. 1;21
that offense is punished under section 18.2-32.1 by a term of imprisonment
of ten to forty years.2"2 The penalty section for the 18.2-32.1 crime lies
between first and second degree murder.' The 1997 statutory scheme also
covers the aggravated malicious wounding of a pregnant woman in section
18.2-51(2)(B).
T 4
The 1997 amendments and enactments by the General Assembly
created a broad array of criminal offenses and punishments for harming
pregnant woman and intending to cause the termination of their pregnan-
cies. Why the General Assembly thought it necessary to include the crime
in the capital murder statute is not clear.
The current text of subsection 18.2-31(11) is set out in the heading to
this section.
208. 1997 Va. Acts, ch. 709.
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210. 1997 Va. Acts, ch. 709.
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XII. Va. Code Ann. Subsection 18.2-31(12) The Willful, Deliberate and Pre-
meditated Killing of a Person under the Age ofFourteen by a Person
Age Twenty-one or Older
On April 22, 1998, the General Assembly added subsection twelve to
section 18.2-31.2"5 That subsection is set out above. The gradation elements
that elevate the premeditated murder to capital murder are the ages of the
victim and the killer. The murder victim must be "under the age of four-
teen" which means thirteen years old or less.216 The killer must be twenty-
one or older. The General Assembly of Virginia had previously made a
premeditated murder a capital crime based on the age of the victim. In the
1985 enactment of section 18.2-31(h), the premeditated killing of a child
under twelve in the commission of aggravated abduction was a capital
crime.21 Subsection (h) was merged into subsection one in 1996,2"8 when
the intent to defile language was added to the subsection. 9 By enacting
subsection 18.2-31(12), the General Assembly has resurrected the old subsec-
tion (h) by creating an age-specific capital offense.
The enactment of subsection twelve is a perfect example of the General
Assembly's political and emotional motivation behind expanding the capital
murder statute. On May 2, 1997, four year old Brenda Ann "Annie"
Leftwich died alone in the utility room of her parents' trailer, tied down to
her urine-drenched bed."0 A rag had been stuffed in her mouth, while the
rest of her body was covered with bruises, bite marks, and scars.2" Wild
squirrels in the room had gnawed on the defenseless child. She was bound,
gagged, and left to die by her parents.2n
The gruesome and disturbing facts of this murder outraged residents of
southwestern Virginia, many of whom clamored for the use of the death
penalty in this case. 3 The media attention from this case, coupled with the
public's furor over the murder, mobilized Virginia legislators into action.
Delegate Phillips of Dickenson County introduced the bill, known as
"Annie's Law," that proposed to make torturing a child to death a capital
crime.224 The bill was rejected for fear of being unconstitutional and then
215. 1998 Va. Acts, ch. 887.
216. GROOT, supra note 16, at 277.
217. 1985 Va. Acts, ch. 428.
218. 1996 Va. Acts, ch. 959.
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later amended by the Senate Courts of Justice Committee to make the
"willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of a child under age eighteen by
an adult" a capital offense." The final wording was later changed to a child
under fourteen murdered by a person twenty-one years of age or older.
Delegate Phillips admitted introducing the death penalty bill because people
appalled by the child's murder asked him to make it a capital crime.226 Of
course, the elements of subsection 18.2-31(12) have little relation to the facts
of the case which generated it and will permit capital murder convictions in
cases that do not, even remotely, resemble "Annie's" case.
The current text of subsection18.2-31(12) is set out in the heading to
this section.
Conclusion
The history of the Virginia capital murder statute, section 18.2-31, has
been one of constant growth and expansion. In the past twenty-five years,
since the inception of section 18.2-31, the General Assembly of Virginia has
added nine subsections to the statute while also expanding the scope of
existing subsections. These additions, augmented by the decision in Payne
v. Commonwealtb,27 have resulted in a quite broad capital murder statute.
There are three primary reasons for the General Assembly's expansion
of the capital murder statute. Some additions or expansions of section 18.2-
31 are a direct result of some gruesome and well-publicized murders. The
murder of four year-old Annie Leftwich mobilized the General Assembly" s
to enact subsection twelve in which killing a child under fourteen is pun-
ished, and the murder of store clerk Muhammad Ashraf Chaudhary led to
the expansion of subsection four to include attempted robbery."' The
General Assembly's attempt to confront and be seen by the public as
responding to societal ills and evils is another motivation for adding crimes
to section 18.2-31. The drug epidemic of the 1980's in which urban areas of
Virginia thought themselves overwhelmed by drug-related homicides
directly led to the enactment of subsections nine and ten.
The final justification for the expansion of section 18.2-31 is the Gen-
eral Assembly's response to decisions made by the Supreme Court of
Virginia in which the capital murder statute was properly read to limit its
application. For example, the General Assembly responded to what it
considered a narrow reading of subsection five by the Supreme Court of
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. 509 S.E.2d 293 (Va. 1999).
228. Panel Passes Revised Annie's Law 'Language a Little Better,' Bill's Sponsor Says,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 9, 1998, at B3.
229. Jeanne Cummings, Axselle Finds Support For Broader Death Penalty, RICHMOND
TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 23, 1989, at 11.
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Virginia in Harward v. Commonwealth.23 Subsection five was amended
immediately thereafter. 31
Section 18.2-31 escaped amendment in 1999. Indications are, however,
that expansion will continue. The General Assembly has recently consid-
ered several proposed capital murder offenses to expand section 18.2-31. As
recently as the 1999 legislative session, the General Assembly considered
another proposed addition to section 18.2-3 1. In response to the gruesome
and disturbing murder in Ceparano v. Commnonwealth,232 in which the victim
was decapitated, Senate Bill 1036233 was proposed.3  That bill would have
made a premeditated killing involving dismemberment a capital offense.235
Although Senate Bill 1036 was not enacted, it is typical of death penalty
legislation. The event that generated the bill was decapitation; the bill refers
to dismemberment. Thus, it is not clear that the bill would have even
reached the case that spawned it, but it is clear the bill would have reached
many cases that did not include decapitation. This form of legislation is
reminiscent of subsection twelve, which began its legislative life as a bill
covering a narrow class of cases but emerged from the legislative process in
a vastly broader form.
In the 1998 legislative session, aside from enacting subsection twelve,
the General Assembly also considered making the following capital offenses:
the murder of a crime watch member, the murder of a spouse after the
issuance of a protective order, and the murder of a witness prior to trial.236
More strikingly, at least two bills in the 1998 session would have made
capital offenses of non-homicide crimes. One of these would have applied
the death penalty to a defendant convicted of a second sexually violent
offense.3 7 The other, House Bill 381,238 would have amended 18.2-248, the
principal drug statute, to make drug kingpins and some drug dealers eligible
for the death penalty. 9  The proposed legislation makes drug kingpin
activity a capital crime because it "results in so many serious injuries and
deaths as to constitute an act of violence committed against all citizens of the
230. 330 S.E.2d 89 (Va. 1985).
231. See 1988 Va. Acts, ch. 550.
232. See Laurence Hammack, Grayson County Case Prompts Bill Proposal,ROANOKE
TIMES, Nov. 18, 1998, at B1.
233. S.R. 1036, 1999 Sess. (Va. 1999).
234. Hammack, supra note 232, at B1.
235. S.R. 1036, 1999 Sess. (Va. 1999).
236. Frank Green, 5 More Capital Offenses Eyed, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 28,
1998, at A6.
237. Id.
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Commonwealth."2' If the bill had passed, it would have virtually subsumed
subsections nine and ten of section 18.2-31, arguably without the General
Assembly's intention to do so. House Bill 381 is another example of the
General Assembly's use of the death penalty to attempt to remedy the
societal problem linked to drugs. Quite clearly, responding to societal
phenomena is a legislative prerogative. Where, however, the legislature
considers application of the ultimate sanction, it should do so with great care
and circumspection. The history and apparent future of section 18.2-31
makes one doubt that its expansion has been, or will be, meticulous.
240. Id.

